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Economic, Ecological and Genetic Approach
Abstract
We develop a conceptual framework for valuing biodiversity from an economic perspec-
tive. We consider biodiversity important because of a number of characteristics or services
that it provides or enhances. We argue for a dynamic economic welfare measure of bio-
diversity that complements the existing literature on beneﬁt-cost approaches and genetic
distance/phylogenic tree approaches, whicht od a t eh a v eb e e nm o r es t a t i c .U s i n gau n i ﬁed
model of optimal economic management of an ecosystem under ecological and genetic con-
straints, we identify gains realized by management policies leading to a more diverse system,
using the Bellman state valuation function of the problem. We show that a more diverse sys-
tem could attain a higher value even though the genetic distance of the species in the more
diverse system could be almost zero. We relate this endogenous measure of the biodiversity
value to ecologically/biologically oriented biodiversity metrics (species richness, Shannon or
Simpson indices).
I. Introduction
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the use of the term “biodiversity” in
fora such as governmental and intergovernmental groups, the popular press and the scientiﬁc
community.1 In this context biodiversity is a term which has acquired a positive connotation
but which is diﬃcult to conceptualize and measure. Diversity measures that have been exten-
sively employed in biological and ecological applications are inﬂuenced by two components:
(i) richness, which refers to the number of species present; and (ii) evenness, which refers to
the distribution of species. The most commonly used diversity metrics range from richness
(R), which is simply the number of species in a landscape, to the Shannon (H) or Simpson
1See for example Harper and Hawksworth (1994).
1(D) diversity indices and their modiﬁcations.2
In the environmental and resource economics literature, the measuring and valuing of bio-
diversity has been approached through the diversity function (Weitzman 1992, 1993; Solow et
al. 1993),3 which is deﬁned in terms of pairwise distances among species, with distance being
a measure of dissimilarity among species. In biological applications this distance is based
on the DNA-DNA hybridization. As shown by Weitzman (1992) for ecological applications,
this diversity function is 50% of the Shannon index. The diversity function can be used
to rank conservation alternatives, with the most desirable alternative being the one show-
ing the relatively highest value for the ecological diversity function. The diversity function
approach is based on the implicit assumption that diversity measured in terms of genetic
distances is desirable.4 It does not make clear, however, why it is desirable, or establish a
mechanism linking the size of genetic distances and some well-deﬁned concept of usefulness or
desirability. The so-called “Noah’s ark problem” is an extension of this approach (Weitzman
1998, Metrick and Weitzman 1998), where species are valued according to both the genetic
distances and direct utility associated with the species which is taken to reﬂect aesthetic or
existence values. The direct utility is, however, exogenously determined and not linked to
2H = −
Pn




i , where Pi is the proportion of individuals or biomass of species
i in the landscape.
3Polasky et al. (1993) and Polasky and Solow (1995) value a collection of species, assuming either that
s p e c i e sp r o v i d i n gt h es a m et y p eo fb e n e ﬁt are perfect substitutes or allowing for imperfect substitution and
dependence between species, with dependence related to genetic distance. Nehring and Puppe (2002) develop
a valuation approach based on evolutionary information through the phylogenetic tree model. This approach,
based on genetic diversity, is the more recent one. The traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis approach to biodiversity
stemming from Krutilla (1967), identiﬁes “use values”, “existence value” and “option value” as sources of value.
See Goulder and Kennedy (1997) for the pros and cons of the cost-beneﬁt approach, and Brown and Shogren
(1998).
4As stated in Weitzman (1992, p. 401), “The most valuable species is the farthest distant from the others
- by any reckoning.”
2the diversity metric.5,6
In our approach we feel that a basic principle for valuing biodiversity should be the
association of diversity with some useful characteristics that it possesses or useful services
that it provides or enhances, since if biodiversity is desirable it should be desirable because of
these characteristics or services.7 This approach is directly related to Heal’s idea (Heal 2000)
of regarding biodiversity as a commodity. Heal suggests that biodiversity is important from
an economic perspective because it provides or enhances ecosystem productivity,8 insurance,9
knowledge10 and ecosystem services.11 Thus, since in this context biodiversity acquires a
positive connotation, our paper will argue for an economic welfare measure of biodiversity
in the following sense: Given two ecosystems A and B, with A being more diverse than
B in terms of the ecologically/biologically oriented biodiversity metrics (species richness,
5Li, Lofgren and Weitzman (2001) follow this approach to characterize optimal harvesting policies in a
ﬁshery.
6See also Montgomery et al. (1999) for an approach based on the taxonomic tree and Simpson et al. (1996)
and Craft and Simpson (2001) for an approach that links diversity to a measure of economic value associated
with “biodiversity prospecting.”
7See also Daily et al. (1997).
8This is associated with the fact that more diverse plant systems are more productive than less diverse ones.
There are a number of empirical studies relating the number of species in ecosystems to plant productivity
(Naeem et al. 1995, 1996; Tilman et al. 1996; Tilman and Lehman 1997; Hooper and Vitousek 1997) which
have found that functional diversity is a principal factor explaining plant productivity.
9Insurance is associated with the possibility of ﬁnding genes in non-commercially used species that can be
used to build resistance against lethal diseases aﬀecting other species. Thus genetic diversity can be used as
insurance against catastrophic events or infections. See also Weitzman (2000).
10Biodiversity can be used as a source of knowledge with which to develop new products in the biotechnology
industry or pharmaceuticals. Rausser and Small (2001) stress the complementarity between genetic resources
and knowledge resources and the incentives for data collection and resource conservation.
11Biodiversity is essential for the proper functioning of an ecosystem so that its ability to provide eco-
nomically important services, such as watershed beneﬁts (Chichilnisky and Heal 1998), ecotourism, carbon
sequestration services of forests, or production of “non-timber forest products”, is maintained. (See also Daily
and Dasgupta (2000).)
3Shannon or Simpson indices), the value of biodiversity is determined by the diﬀerence between
the Bellman state valuation functions of optimal management, VA − VB. Thus, we value
biodiversity not based on genetic distances but in terms of the value of characteristics or
services that an ecosystem provides or enhances when managed optimally, obtaining in this
way an endogenous measure for biodiversity valuation.12
The purpose of this paper is to make the above intuitive idea of biodiversity valuation
more precise. We do it in the context of two species whose “genetic distance” is almost zero
in the sense of Weitzman (1992) and Solow et al. (1993), but where the economic value of
the optimally-managed system with one of the species extinct is less than the economic value
of the optimally-managed system with both species present.
In order to have a very precise context for clear exposition, we consider an agroecological
example where the general service provided by the ecosystem is food and the value of crop
diversity stems from its role in producing food. In this example optimal managment of crop
diversity involves trading oﬀ the gains from specialization to the most desirable crop today
against facing a less desirable gene pool of threats to the system as a whole tomorrow. As
we shall see, this framing of the problem exposes which dynamic feedback loops and which
system parameters must be properly understood in order to manage the system properly.
More speciﬁcally in our example the dynamics of the species mix of threats to the system’s
ability to provide valuable services is controlled indirectly by controlling the dynamics of
the gene pool of threatening species by directly controlling the dynamics of the crop mix
over time. More precisely the crop mix dynamics are controlled to maintain a desirable gene
pool equilibrium. In this way we reveal which models need to be built of which parts of
the ecosystem, which parameters need to be measured, and which uncertainties are most
worthwhile to resolve, in order to properly manage the system to maximize its output of
12This approach can also be regarded as connecting the ecologically/biologically oriented biodiversity met-
rics, with an endogenous measure of economic value of biodiversity.
4services. While an agroecological example appears somewhat special (even though food is
of key importance to human survival), the trade-oﬀ between managing some part of an
ecosystem to achieve better services in the short term and the longer term objective of
maintenance of the whole system’s ability to deliver service ﬂow in the future seems quite
general.13
More speciﬁcally, the two varieties of species, i =1 ,2, in our model, which are similar from
a functionalist viewpoint, are harvested on a ﬁxed area and the harvest has a market value.
On the ecological side, the species compete for a limiting resource in the context of a Pacala-
Tilman mechanistic resource-based model (Tilman 1982, 1988; Pacala and Tilman 1994).
The system also contains more than one type of pest, with the mortality rate of the species
depending on the relative abundance of a certain type of pest. Management decisions refer
13For example, a common complaint of ecologists is that humans too often manage an ecosystem to op-
timize some short term goal, e.g. crop, forest, or animal yield, or landscape appearance, but this sets oﬀ
unobserved or ignored interaction dynamics, which ultimately lead to a degradation or collapse of the system
(Gunderson and Holling 2001). We illustrate how this complaint can be approached by explicit modelling in
our example which is general enough to reveal dynamic links of interaction between parameters such as degree
of assortative mating of pests, genetic ﬁt n e s sv a l u e so fd i ﬀerent pest genotypes, and crop mix, which play a
key role in maintenance of the system’s ability to deliver the desired service ﬂow. Our type of modelling and
analysis immediately suggest generalizations to deal with practical issues of model uncertainty such as “robust
control”. For example Bernhard (2002) shows how one should react to using control channels to control the
system dynamics as a function of “degree” of trust in linking parameters of each part of the system with
its other parts, and he shows how this “degree” of trust can be viewed by using parameter uncertainties.
Our ultimate goal is to contribute to a quantitative approach to key problems of management of increasingly
human dominated ecosystems. In particular, our type of approach can lead to quantitative formulations of
precautionary principles and a theory of who should bear the burden of proof in environmental disputes.
In other words, the explicit modelling of the embedded dynamic linkage of the ecosystem part of primary
interest with the rest of the ecosystem that we illustrate here can be viewed as a quantitative approach to the
“eco-pragmatism” view advocated by Farber (1999). Of course we will barely make a dent in this formidable
problem within the scope of one paper. More will be said about this in our concluding section.
5to the optimal distribution of land between the two varieties, or equivalently the crop mix,
when total harvest beneﬁts are maximized subject to the constraints imposed by the ecological
and genetic mechanisms. If the land is divided between the two varieties, then the richness
biodiversity metric is Rb =2for the subsystem of the plants, while the Shannon or Simpson
indices depend on the relative amount of land devoted to each variety. If the management
decisions lead to a monoculture then Rb =1 , while H = D =0 . Thus this framework can
be used to determine the equilibrium diversity corresponding to certain optimizing behavior
and the corresponding state valuation function. The value of genetic diversity is the extra
economic value, measured by the Bellman value function, that is realized by a management
policy that attains am o r ed i v e r s especies base. We show that in our model, while genetic
distance can go to zero, the value function diﬀerence of the two assemblies can go to plus
inﬁnity, depending on the shape of the demand curve, in the case where a resistant pest kills
both varieties.
A plausible generalization of our model could be towards a more general model of antag-
onistic co-evolution of many species and parasites or pests,14 in which management decisions
leading to a less diverse group of species could increase the eﬀectiveness of pests in attacking
the less diverse group of species. More generally our model focuses attention on the dy-
namic links between the set, S, of species of primary interest, i.e. the set of service-providing
species and the rest of the ecosystem in which S is embedded. While we used the example
of S={service providing plants} and “rest of ecosystem”={gene pool of pests}, the point
we make is far more general than this particular example. To put it another way, in our
example, the gene pool is part of the “natural capital” “state vector” that one needs to put
into the Bellman state valuation function in order to properly value the whole ecosystem.
Our analysis will show how reduction of the size of set S c a ne a s i l yl e a dt oc o l l a p s eo ft h e
14This co-evolution refers to the so-called “red queen” hypothesis. See our concluding section for a more
detailed exposition.
6ability of S to provide essential services because of the interaction dynamics with the rest of
the ecosystem in which S is embedded.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the uniﬁed eco-
nomic/ecological/genetic model. Section III deﬁnes the economic welfare measure of bio-
diversity. In section IV the uniﬁed model is solved. Given the highly nonlinear nature of
the solution we perform numerical simulations and we determine the gain in value from a
more diverse system, which provides the endogenous value of biodiversity. The last section
concludes.
II. Economic Management of Ecosystems under Ecological and Genetic
Constraints
In order to develop an integrated model of management of an ecosystem when natural selec-
tion occurs, we consider an ecosystem with plant - pest interactions. To put the problem in
the context described in the Introduction, we assume that the plant comes in two varieties,
i =1 ,2, while the pest comes in three types (genotypes), A1A1,A 1A2 = A2A1, and A2A2,
where A1 and A2 denote distinct genes. Plant variety 1 kills pest types A1A1 and A1A2 but
n o tp e s tt y p eA2A2, while plant variety 2 is not immune to any type of pest.15
15This set-up is motivated by genetic engineering literature on Bt-crops (e.g. Ives 1996, Ives and Andow
2002) like Bt-corn, where variety 1=Bt-corn and variety 2=non-Bt-corn. The pest is the European corn
borer. A protein that is found in the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, and is engineered into the corn
tissues, is lethal to the European corn borer when ingested. The advantages of using Bt-corn hybrids include
improved standability and plant health, higher yields, and fewer insecticide applications (e.g. Hurley et al.
1999). Given these advantages of Bt-corn, it seems most likely that proﬁt-maximizing farmers will be willing
to plant only Bt-corn in a given area. This however might create an externality due to the operation of
natural selection mechanisms. When the whole area is planted with Bt-corn, borers remaining from the
ﬁrst generation will be those which are resistant to the protein. These borers will produce a predominantly
resistant second generation of borers and the advantage of the Bt-corn will disappear. The high-dose/refuge
strategy for resistance management is thought to delay resistance, because the refuge provides a source for
7The objective of economic management for the ecosystem is the maximization of the
present value of harvesting. Consider a given area, with size normalized to unity, and let
Hi (t),i=1 ,2 denote harvest of plant variety i at time t, and x(t) ∈ [0,1] denote the
proportion of the land planted with variety 1. Let D(H (t)),H (t)=H1 (t)+H2 (t) be the
inverse demand function and let v(H)=
R H
z0 D(z)dz be the beneﬁt function. Assuming,
for simplicity, zero harvesting cost, and a discount rate ρ > 0, the objective of economic




Maximization problem (1) is, however, subject to additional constraints imposed by the
underlying biological and ecological factors. On the ecological side we assume that the two
plants compete for a limiting resource (e.g. nitrates), thus, the growth of biomass for each
plant is aﬀected by the availability of this resource. On the other hand resource consumption
by the plants aﬀects the availability of the resource. In this set up, the rate of growth of
the plant biomass depends on the diﬀerence between the biomass reproduction rate, which is
resource dependent, and the death rate, and the harvest rate, while the rate of change of the
resource depends on the diﬀerence between its supply and its consumption by the plants.16
Formally the equations characterizing biomass and resource evolution which describe the
ecological side of our model can be stated as:
˙ Bi = Bi [gR− mi] − Hi ,i=1 ,2 ,B i (0) = B0
i (2)
˙ R = S − aR − gw
X
i=1,2





,B= B1 + B2 (4)
susceptible borers to mate with resistant ones, so that their oﬀspring can be killed by Bt-corn.
16This set up for the ecological model corresponds to Tilman’s mechanistic resource-based model of species
competition (Tilman 1982, 1988; Pacala and Tilman 1994).
8B1 = xB , B2 =( 1− x)B,H= H1 + H2 (5)
Equation (2) describes the growth of the varieties’ biomass Bi where: g is the coeﬃcient
of the biomass growth function, assumed to be the same for the two types of plants; R is the
resource; mi is the death rate; and Hi is the harvesting of the variety per unit time. Equation
(3) describes the resource dynamics where S − aR is the net amount of the resource (such
as nutrients) supplied at time t, with S being exogenous natural supply and aR reﬂecting
natural resource removal, where a can be interpreted as an erosion or a leaching rate.17 The
term wg
P
i=1,2 Bi is the consumption of the resource by the two varieties, with w being a
constant reﬂecting the concentration of the resource in the tissues of corn (Pacala and Tilman
1994).
The fact, however, that plant variety 1 is immune to pest types A1A1 and A1A2 but not
to A2A2, while plant variety 2 is not immune to any type of pest, makes it necessary to take
into account the evolution of the pest population. This is because the death rate of each
plant variety depends on the relative abundance of genes A1 and A2 i nt h ep e s tg e n ep o o l .
Thus in (2) the death rate depends on the proportion, p, of A1 genes in the genetic pool of
the pest population, with the proportion of A2 genes being (1 − p). Thus, the death rate for
each plant is a function of p or mi = di (p). Given the relative immunities of plants 1 and
2, it follows that the higher the proportion of gene types A1 in the gene pool, the lower the
death rate of plant variety 1, and the higher its productivity advantage over plant variety 2.
This can be stated as:
d2 (p)=d2 ,d 1 (p)=pd1 +( 1− p)d2 with d1 <d 2 (6)
Thus if p =1 , only the A1A1 type exists in the pest gene pool. Variety 1 kills all A1A1 types
17Resource supply could be modelled more realistically by introducing the possibility of augmenting it
through fertilization. In this case the net ﬂow of nutrients would be S +h(F)−aR,w h e r eh(F) is additional
resource supply through fertilization F. Although it is relatively straightforward to introduce fertilization, we
choose not to, in the interests of simplicity. Our basic results do not depend on the presence of fertilization.
9and has a growth advantage over variety 2, since d1 (1) = d1 <d 2. On the other hand, if
p =0 , only the A2A2 g e n o t y p ee x i s t si nt h ep e s tg e n ep o o lw h i c hi sr e s i s t a n tt ov a r i e t y1
(as well as variety 2). Then d1 (0) = d2 and the growth advantage of variety 1 is eliminated.
Then, the two varieties are identical.
Since genetics aﬀects productivity we need to explain how the diﬀerent pest types spread
in the population relative to each other. This is essentially determined by the evolution of
p from generation to generation, assuming random mating and ﬁxed survival probabilities
for the diﬀerent types. To set out the genetic part of our model, let x be the proportion
of the area planted with variety 1. Then the proportion p = p(t) of A1 genes in the pest
gene-pool evolves, from generation to generation, according to the fundamental equation of
evolutionary biology, as:18
˙ p = p[G(p,x) − 1] ,p(0) = p0 (7)
G(p,x)=
W11 (x)p + W12 (x)(1− p)
W11 (x)p2 +2 W12 (x)p(1 − p)+W22 (x)(1− p)
2 (8)
Wij (x)=xwij (1) + (1 − x)wij (2) ,i=1 ,2 (9)
where wij (1),w ij (2) are the viability ﬁtness of the ij pest type for plant variety 1 or 2
respectively. When plant variety 1 kills the A1A1 and A1A2 genotypes but not the A2A2, we
have that w11 (1) = w12 (1) = 0, while w22 (1) > 0. On the other hand wij (2) > 0,i=1 ,2.
The maximization of (1) subject to (2) - (9) provides, for the ﬁr s tt i m et oo u rk n o w l e d g e ,
an integration of optimal management theory using a Pacala-Tilman resource-based model of
18In population genetics terminology we model the evolution of the pest population by Hardy-Weinberg
mating and one locus, two alleles genetics. See, for example, Feldman (1989) or Roughgarden (1998). Lo-
calization eﬀects where spatially nearby pests are more likely to mate with each other than spatially more
distant pests, as well as assortative mating eﬀects, can lead to more complicated evolution dynamics than
those based upon Hardy-Weinberg mating (Ives 1996, Ives and Andow 2002) and even make existence of a
steady-state reserve strategy problematic. We ignore such complications in the current piece which is only
intended to serve as a methaphorical model of gene-pool-speciﬁc functional services of biodiversity and not as
a realistic model of resistance management.
10species competition to model the ecological side, with explicit population genetics to model
natural selection. In this optimization problem, the choice of x will determine the relative
sizes of the areas planted with variety 1 and variety 2.19 This allocation of land will aﬀect
the evolution of pest population in the gene pool through the subsystem (6)-(9). The value
of p determined through this subsystem aﬀects in turn the evolution of the biomasses for
each variety through the growth equations (2) and eventually the equilibrium biodiversity.
III. An Economic Welfare Measure of Biodiversity
In order to derive an economic welfare measure of biodiversity, we use the value function
associated with dynamic programming representation of the ecosystem planning problem
(1).20 Let s =(B1,B2,R,p) and u =(H1,H 2,x) be the state and control vectors respectively,
associated with the maximization of (1) subject to (2) - (9), and let f (s,u) be the vector of
transition equations (2),(3) and (7). Then the value function for this problem is deﬁned as:
V (s)=m a x
u∈Us
J (s;u) (10)
while the dynamic programming equation is obtained as:
ρV (s)=H(s,∂sV (s)) , H(s,λ)=m a x
u∈Us
{v(H)+λ · f (s,u)} (11)
where H is the maximized Hamiltonian for problem (1), ∂sV (s) is the vector of the ﬁrst
derivatives of the value function with respect to the state variable, λ = ∂sV (s) is the vector
of costate variables and Us is a compact control space. Since (11) is fundamental in intertem-
poral welfare economics, showing that the optimized Hamiltonian equals the return on social
well-being,21 our formulation of social well-being extends previous discussions by including
19In terms of Bt- c o r na n a l y s i st h i sc o n s t i t u t e sar e f u g es t r a t e g y .
20This approach has been used in welfare considerations of National Accounting and in particular for the
deﬁnition of the Net National Product and the evaluation of policy reforms. See, for example, Weitzman
(1976), Dasgupta and Maler (2000) or Hartwick (2000).
21See Dasgupta and Maler (2000), where they show that the result holds even for non-optimizing economies.
They also show that if v (H) is linear then Weitzman’s interpretation of Net National Product as the constant-
11through (11) the value of the gene pool as part of society’s total capital base.
From (11) the optimal stationary feedback policy functions H∗
i = H∗
i (s),i=1 ,2,x ∗ =
x∗ (s) can be derived. Then, at a corresponding optimal steady state (OSS),¯ s =
¡ ¯ B1, ¯ B2, ¯ R, ¯ p
¢
,





, ¯ H∗ = ¯ H∗
1 + ¯ H∗
2 (12)
This argument implies that for any two stationary feedback policy functions resulting from
diﬀerent structures of the optimization problem,22 and leading to diﬀering biodiversity met-
rics (e.g. number of species), the value function (12) can be used to evaluate biodiversity.
This can be accomplished by comparing the value functions of the two optimization problems.
If for our speciﬁc problem we consider the value functions associated with a two-species
system and a one-species system, V 2 ¡
s2¢
and V 1 ¡
s1¢
respectively, then the OSS economic
welfare measure of biodiversity can be deﬁned as:
V 2 ¡
¯ s2¢









where ¯ H∗j = H∗i (¯ s),j=1 ,2 is the OSS stationary feedback policy function associated
with each system. The right hand side of (13) can be obtained by solving the optimal control
representation of the problem, determining the OSS, and then evaluating the controls H∗j (s),
and x∗ (s) at the OSS.
We consider, therefore, two alternative policy functions which are associated with diﬀerent
property rights to the gene pool. When there is a system of full property rights to the gene
pool, then optimal management maximizes (1) subject to (2) - (9). We call this problem the
equivalent consumption holds.
22For example, if death rates d1 and d2 are regarded as ﬁxed parameters, we have an optimization problem
where the genetic constraints (7) - (9) are not taken into account. The feedback policy function for this problem
will diﬀer from the corresponding policy function when d1 and d2 are not regarded as ﬁxed parameters, and
the genetic constraints are taken into account.
12socially-optimal management problem (SOMP), since its solution corresponds to the ﬁrst
best solution.
When there is a lack of property rights then the genetic constraints (7) -(9) are ignored.
We call this solution the privately-optimal management problem (POMP) since it corresponds
to a situation where private optimizing agents are “small” and they ignore the impact of their
decisions regarding the species variety mix on the gene pool. The implications of the lack of
property rights to the gene pool can be further analyzed by considering the genetic subsystem
(7) -(9).
For any ﬁx e dl a n da l l o c a t i o ns t r a t e g yx, pest ﬁtness is determined through (9) and the
evolution of the pest population is determined through (7). Then, equilibrium for (7) is
deﬁned, for any given x, as:
p∗ : G(p∗,x) − 1=0 ,p ∗ 6=0 (14)
In general (14) has three possible equilibria, which depend on the choice of land allocation
x : (i) ¯ p1 =1 , (ii) ¯ p2 =0 , and (iii) ¯ p3 ∈ (0,1). In ¯ p1 only the A1 gene type exists in the
gene pool, in ¯ p2 only the A2 gene type exists, while in ¯ p3 both A1 and A2 exist. In popula-
tion genetics terminology ¯ p1 and ¯ p2 are monomorphic equilibria, while ¯ p3 is a polymorphic
equilibrium. It is a standard result of population genetics23 that if
W12 (x) >W 22 (x) and W12 (x) > max{W11 (x),W 22 (x)} (15)
the polymorphic equilibrium ¯ p3 is stable, while if W22 (x) >W 12 (x) the monomorphic equi-
librium ¯ p2 =0is stable.
It can easily be seen from (9) that, since W12 (x) >W 22 (x) cannot hold for all x ∈ [0,1],
the polymorphic stability condition will be satisﬁed for small x but it will be violated for
x close to 1. In the limiting case of x =1 , that is when the entire area is planted with
variety 1 which kills A1A1 and A1A2 genes, we have W12 (1) = W11 (1) = 0, while W22 (1) =
23See for example Feldman (1989) or Roughgarden (1998).
13w22 (i =1 )> 0. This implies that for x suﬃciently close to 1 the stability condition is most
likely to be violated. With x =1and W12 (1) = W11 (1) = 0, and W22 >W 12 >W 11, and x
close to one, or x ∈ (1 − ε], ε > 0, we say that there is directional selection for A2, with ¯ p2
being the stable monomorphism. In this case G(p,x)=0in (8) and the diﬀerential equation
(7) can be written as:
˙ p =0− p, or p(t|x=1)=p0e−t (16)
Thus when x =1the resistance of the system to the pest is reduced at the most rapid rate.
This means that by planting the area with only variety 1, the system generates directional
s e l e c t i o nt o w a r dt h eA2A2 pest type. Therefore, when the genetic constraint is ignored, the
natural selection mechanism results in a stable monomorphic equilibrium which eliminates
the productivity advantage of variety 1, since when ¯ p2 =0 , only the pest type A2A2 is present
and neither variety 1 nor variety 2 is immune to this type of pest.24 That is, variety 1 is now
identical to variety 2, and the biodiversity richness metric on the plant side is Rb =1 .
IV. Optimal Management and Biodiversity Valuation
We start by analyzing the solution for the SOMP. This solution involves choosing time paths
for the controls Hi (t),i=1 ,2 and x(t) to maximize (1) subject to (2)-(9). To simplify things
we assume that both plant varieties sell at the same competitive price which is normalized
to one, so that v(H)=H1 + H2. The maximization problem includes four state variables
(B1 (t),B 2 (t),R(t),p(t)) and it is linear with respect to harvesting Hi (t).25 This linearity
24In Nature the tiny genotypic diﬀerence in two “apparently same” species might not be detectable by human
m a n a g e r s ,s ot h e“ r e s i s t a n c e ”s p e c i e si se l i m i n a t e da n dt h i ss e r v e sa sa“ s l o wv a r i a b l e ”t oc r e a t ea nu n p l e a s a n t
“Holling surprise” when the pests evolve to eliminate the remaining species upon which some important
ecosystem function depends. This insight suggests future extensions of our work to managing systems where
t h er o l eo fs o m es p e c i e si nm a i n t a i n i n gr e s i s t a n c et op e s t si su n o b s e r v a b l eb e c a u s et h ep h e n o t y p i cd i s t a n c e
upon which management strategies are based appears to be zero, even though the genotypic distance while
”small” is still positive—yet it is critical.
25Linearity in H requires the additional constraint 0 ≤ Hi ≤ K
max so that the optimization problem is
14allows the reduction of the problem’s dimensionality with respect to the state variables, by a
transformation into a Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) problem. Let B = B1+B2 denote
total biomass and µ, q denote the costate variables associated with the state variables R and
p respectively. The OSS for the SOMP, as determined by the solution of the corresponding
MRAP problem, is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If an OSS for the MRAP exists, then it is determined for the state-
costate vector (R,µ,p,q) by the solution of the modiﬁed Hamiltonian dynamic system (MHDS)
0=S − aR − gwRB∗ (17)
0=G(p,x∗) − 1 (18)







In this system x∗ and B∗, which are the optimal stationary feedback policy functions for the
MRAP problem, are deﬁned as:
x∗ =
µgwR − gR+ d2 + ρ
p(d2 − d1)






= β (R,µ,p,q) (22)
Then, the OSS, land allocation strategy x∗, total biomass B
































2 =( 1 − x)B
∗ ¡




15For proof see Appendix.
The OSS levels B
∗ and ¯ H∗ for the biomass and the ﬂow of harvesting respectively, deter-
mine the value of the ecosystem’s output at the social maximum when diversity is preserved
and all the ecological and genetic constraints have been taken into account. Then from the



















We turn now to the case where there are no property rights at all to the gene pool and we
analyze the POMP which ignores the genetic constraint. In cases where the decision-making
farmers operate on a small scale and do not take into account the eﬀects of their actions on
diversity, the genetic constraint and thus potential gains from diversity could be ignored. We
expect reality to be between the two polar cases of the SOMP and the POMP, since there is
evidence that farmers take into eﬀect potential gains from diversity if they are operating on
a large scale. Thus we would like to consider the POMP solution as a metaphor for providing
a yardstick in order to more precisely measure gains from the continuation of diversity.
Proposition 2: If the genetic constraint is ignored at the POMP, then at the OSS for
this problem x =1 , p =0 , B (d2)=
S−aR(d2)









For proof, see Appendix.
This implies that the variety 1 monoculture with equilibrium biomass B (d1) and corre-
sponding resource level R(d1) is not stable. The stable equilibrium is a variety 2 monoculture
where the productivity advantage of variety 1 has been eliminated. The diﬀerence B
∗−B (d2)
determines the biomass gain in the social maximand as a result of keeping a more diverse
system. From the dynamic programming equation the OSS value of the one-species system
is V 1 =
¯ H(d2)
ρ . Then from (13) the OSS economic welfare measure of biodiversity is deter-
mined by V 2 −V 1. This value corresponds to the change in the biodiversity metrics (species
16richness, H, D) from a homogenous system to a diverse system.
A. Numerical Approximations to Biodiversity Valuation
System (17)-(20) that determines the OSS for the uniﬁed model is highly nonlinear. Thus
in order to obtain some insights into the structure of the solution and verify whether or
not biodiversity valuation through V 2 − V 1 can be detected, we resort to some numerical
simulations.








for the yardstick case of the POMP, with ﬁtness structure:
w11 (2) = w22 (1) = w22 (2) = w and w12 (2) = (1 + s)w, s ≷ 0
with w11 (1) = w12 (1) = 0 under the assumption that plant variety 1 kills A1A1 and A1A2
pest types, and parameter values:
ρ =0 .01,S=2 ,d 1 =0 .05;a =0 .10;w =0 .05;g =0 .05,d 2 = {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}
When s>0 we say that there is heterozygotic ﬁtness advantage. The results are shown
in table 1.
Table 1: Steady-State Resource and Biomass Levels when the Genetic Con-
straint is Ignored
d2 R(d1) R(d2) B (d1) B (d2) %l o s si nb i o m a s s
0.5 4.72586 14.0897 129.281 16.779 87.02
0.4 4.72586 12.5887 129.281 23.549 81.78
0.3 4.72586 10.9029 129.281 33.375 74.18
0.2 4.72586 8.93162 129.281 49.569 61.66
0.1 4.72586 6.4253 129.281 84.507 34.63
The R(d1), B (d1) are the unstable equilibria, while the R(d2), B (d2) are the stable equi-
libria where the productivity advantage of variety 1 has been eliminated. The loss in biomass
17is the result of pest adaptation due to the natural selection mechanism. As anticipated, the
smaller the deviation between the two death rates (that is, the smaller the productivity ad-
vantage of variety 1), the smaller the percentage loss in biomass. The richness metric for both
the plant and the pest subsystems are Rb =1 , w h i l ef o rt h ep l a n ts u b s y s t e mH = D =0 .
At the next step we calculate the OSS for the SOMP by numerically solving the nonlinear
system (17)-(20).26 In table 2 we present solutions for diﬀerent values of the ﬁtness diﬀerential
s and d2, with the rest of the parameters the same as those used for table 1. Table 2 includes
the steady states, the percentage gain in biomass and harvesting of the OSS at the social
optimum, relative to the variety 2 monoculture which eventually emerges when the genetic
constraint is ignored, the value of biodiversity determined by V 2 −V 1, and the Shannon and
Simpson biodiversity indices. It should be noted that the richness metric is Rb =2for the
plant subsystem and Rb =3for the pest subsystem.
[Table 2 ]
Our numerical simulations indicate that the socially-optimal solution results in a diverse
system with two species present,27 and that there is always a percentage gain in equilibrium,
harvesting, biomass and a positive biodiversity value relative to the homogeneous one-species
s y s t e m .T h eg a i ni nv a l u ec a nb er e g a r d e da sa nendogenous measure of the value of biodi-
versity which corresponds to a change from the monoculture biodiversity metrics, Rb =1 ,
H = D =0 , to the polyculture biodiversity metrics Rb =2 ,R b =3for the plant/pest
subsystems respectively, and the H,D indices corresponding to the speciﬁc parameter con-
stellations. The results indicate that the higher the advantage of the heterozygote, that is
the value of s, for a given death rate d2, the higher the harvesting, biomass and biodiver-
sity value.28 Our results also indicate that for varying s, increased diversity at the social
26The numerical solutions were obtained using Mathematica 4.0 (Wolfram 1999) using both Newton’s
method and the secant method with accuracy goal set at 10.
27For s = −0.02 the socially-optimal choice is x
∗ =0 .
28A similar pattern holds for s<0.
18optimum, as indicated by an increase in the H,D indices, is associated with a higher bio-
diversity value.29 Thus, for our simulations, the social maximand increases with diversity,
and our measure of diversity value depends not only on the ecological parameters, but also
on economic parameters, such as market prices and the discount rate. Finally, it should be
noted that a biodiversity value emerges for the more diverse system, even though the genetic
distance between the two varieties is almost zero.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a conceptual framework for valuing biodiversity from an economic
perspective. Our approach is based on the principle that biodiversity is important because of
a number of characteristics or services that it provides or enhances. We develop an economic
welfare measure of biodiversity by comparing the Bellman state valuation functions which
are associated with feedback policy functions of alternative optimization problems. The
optimization problems are characterized by the existence or not of property rights to the
gene pool, which is part of the state vector of the ecosystem. We thus obtain an endogenous
measure of the biodiversity value and link this measure to ecologically/biologically oriented
biodiversity metrics (species richness, Shannon, Simpson, diversity function) that correspond
to the equilibrium diversities of the optimizing models.
By taking into account ecological and genetic constraints implying that crop diversity
reduces pest eﬀectiveness, we determine the socially-optimal harvesting rules and crop mix
when there is a system of full property rights to the gene pool. Our results indicate that
there is a gain at the social optimum from having a more diverse system, relative to the polar
case of a homogenous system emerging from private optimizing decisions with no property
29For ﬁxed s =0 .5 the H and D indices are approximately constant for varying death rates. There is
always, however, a positive biodiversity value relative to the homogenous system, which is inversely related
to the death rate d2.
19rights to the gene pool. This gain - which is deﬁn e db yt h ee x t r av a l u e ,m e a s u r e di nt e r m s
of the OSS Bellman state valuation function, which is attained by a more diverse system
- is the value of genetic diversity. By using numerical simulations, we are able to conﬁrm
our theoretical results and to obtain numerical measures of the value of biodiversity and the
corresponding ecologically/biologically oriented biodiversity metrics.30
In relation to the four sources of economic value for biodiversity - productivity, insurance,
knowledge and services - mentioned in the introduction (Heal 2000), it seems that since in
our model biodiversity increases productivity by protecting the group from lethal pests, the
productivity and the insurance value sources are captured together. In a sense, biodiver-
sity increases productivity through an insurance mechanism that is produced by the role of
biodiversity in controlling the dynamics of natural selection of pest species.
If the shape of the demand curve D(H) is more general than the one used in this paper,
the loss of variety 2 (non Bt crop) could generate a huge loss in value because it leads to
all resistant pests (borers). If we assume resistant borers are totally fatal to corn, then crop
yields are ultimately zero. In this case if the harvest is “essential” in demand in the sense that
D(0) →∞ , then the losses are huge. Therefore, the “true” economic value of biodiversity
in this example of almost zero “DNA distance”31 could be huge depending upon the shape
of the demand curve.
Although we use a two-species system, the main point of our paper can be regarded as
quite general, on the basis of the following argument. Suppose that we have an ecosystem
30Tilman et al. (2002), using a similar mechanistic resource-based model of species competition, with-
out stressing the impact of the genetic subsystem or introducing optimal economic management, show that
ecosystem simpliﬁcation resulting from selective harvesting, replanting harvested ecosystems with one or few
species and habitat fragmentation, can lead to decreased productivity and increased year-to-year variation of
productivity.
31For example only one gene was changed in the maize genome to produce Bt-corn and the maize genome,
like any real genome, is huge.
20that consists of a set of “similar” varieties (or species), the collection of which is essential
to providing a valued ecosystem service. Call this set S = {s1,s 2,...,s n} where s denotes
species. Each member si of the collection S c a nd oa ne s s e n t i a l l ye q u a lj o bo fp r o v i d i n gt h a t
service. So it looks (on the surface) that there is no reason to preserve all of these similar
species. However, there is a collection of species such as predator or parasite that endangers
each member of S.C a l lt h i ss e tP = {p1,p 2,...,p m}.R a n kt h eP’s as p1 <p 2 <. . .<p m,
with pm the most lethal to all the members of S and p1 the least harmful to members of S.
The ability to deﬂect members of P varies across the si.R a n kt h esi from s1 <s 2 <. . .<s n
from most vulnerable to members of P to least vulnerable to members of P.I fs1 is the only
member of S present, the population distribution across pi in P evolves to a wide distribution.
If sn is the only member of S present, the population distribution of pi in P evolves to only
the most lethal type pm. T h i si ss ob e c a u s esn is the least vulnerable, so only the most
eﬀective member of P,i . e .pm, can deal with the “defenses” of sn.
A plant can use resources to put up defenses against members of P (e.g. produce toxins in
its root system to ﬁght pathogens) but if it uses more resources to do this, it has less resources
for other functions like roots, shoots, and leaves. So it might be natural for humans to think
that they can delete sn to open space in the ecosystem for some other si,s a ys1,b e c a u s esn’s
bigger assignment to defense resources leaves it with less production of the visible ecosystem
services that interests the humans. This thinking suggests that humans might selectively
delete the plants that are providing the most useful (but “invisible”) ecosystem “service” of
maintaining a P-diversity, that supports sustainable production of S-services. That is, the
most desirable plant to humans may be the least desirable for the objective of maintaining
a desirable biodiversity of the set P, thus the selective narrowing by humans of S-diversity
leads to a malevolent narrowing of P-diversity that ultimately threatens existence of the
service S.
In the context of the discussion regarding social well-being, our work not only shows that
21when we want to correct the Net National Product for ecosystem services, the complete gene
pool should be shadow priced, but also that this shadow pricing should not always be done
based on “genetic distance” diversity measures.
In the context of externalities associated with genetic engineering, one might view the tac-
tics of “re-engineering” genetically modiﬁed plants as an attempt by humans to simulate the
adaption mechanism of “sex” in Nature, where sex enables a slow-moving genetic dynamics
host to survive a fast-moving genetic dynamics pest (Axelrod 1997). However the incentive
of farmers to always use the most productive variety contributes a negative externality in the
form of narrowing the population of crop genotypes which “speeds up” the evolution of the
pest population towards the most lethal pest genotype. Our current model can be viewed
as a tractible compromise that attempts to abstract out the essential forces in a way that
hopefully contributes to an understanding of the more complex reality dynamics.
Of course more realistic genetic and mating assumptions can be used. Ives and Andow
(2002) use more realistic genetics and mating dynamics in modeling evolution of resistance
to Bt crops, by allowing non assortative (non-random) mating, and limited dispersal of pests
from their natal ﬁelds. We are using this example, however, only as a parable to communicate
the usefulness of an economic-valuation-based deﬁnition of “increased biodiversity.” In
general there are always likely to be unobserved services provided by extra biodiversity.
The conceptual model developed in this paper can also be generalized to a multi-variety
set up, which involves antagonistic co-evolution of the species of a functional group and
pest or parasites according to the so-called “Red Queen” hypothesis.32 A c c o r d i n gt ot h i s
hypothesis, parasites evolve ceaselessly in response to perpetual evolution of species’ (or
hosts’) resistance. The co-evolution of the parasites’ ability to attack (virulence) and the
hosts’ resistance is expected to indicate persistent ﬂuctuations of resistance and virulence.
32See for example Van Valen (1973), May and Anderson (1983), Ebert and Hamilton (1996) and Kawecki
(1998).
22In this context the Red Queen hypothesis generates a continuous need for variation, and a
common clone will be wiped out by parasites that have adapted to parasitize it.33
The economic optimization developed in this paper basically argues that if we monocul-
turalize group G to the “most desirable” species s∗ in G, we speed up evolution of a pest
genotype that can destroy the group. A fuller model would have a “genetic arms race”
of a group P = {p1,p 2,...,p m} of pests co-evolving in a Red Queen-type race against the
target functional group G. When private proﬁt-optimization incentives ignore Red Queen
co-evolution and reduce the diversity of the group, or even monoculturalize the G side of
this Red Queen race, the speed of the pest side increases and might wipe out the less diverse
group, with a consequent welfare loss.
Another more general mechanism associated with the plant-pest interactions developed
in this paper, which could cover multiple-species, multiple-pest cases, can be found in the
hypothesis that a more diverse system is less susceptible to pest attacks because of: (i) the
disruptive-crop hypothesis, (ii) the trap-crop hypothesis, and (iii) the enemies hypothesis.34
Finally, regarding generalizations, it should be pointed out that since ecosystem services of
diﬀerent types are delivered by functional groups of diﬀerent types, we expect to ﬁnd in each
functional group-ecosystem service type pair, a particular member of that functional group
that is “most eﬃcient” at delivering the services that humans desire. Relevant examples of
most desirable species could be green lawn grass for lawn services, a most desirable corn
species for corn food services, a most desirable wheat species for wheat food services, and so
33There are empirical studies documenting the presence of genetic variation for resistance against plant
pathogens or against animal parasites. See, for example, Carius et al. (2001) or Lively and Dybdahl (2000)
for an empirical veriﬁcation of the Red Queen hypothesis for fresh water snails in New Zealand.
34In the disruptive-crop hypothesis a new species disrupts the ability of the pest to attack the proper host,
in the trap-crop hypothesis a new species attracts pests that would be detrimental to a main species, while
in the enemies case a diverse system attracts more predators than a monoculture and reduces pests through
predation. For details, see Vandermeer (1989).
23on. If, for example, we narrow the lawn grass species distribution down to one, the genetics
Red Queen race for pathogens (e.g. leaf spot, necrotic ring spot, anthracnose) might speed
up and could eliminate the single species.
The idea of associating reduction of diversity within a functional group with increased
ability of pests to attack the remaining host and reduce the value of the system could also be
associated with the genetic distance-based approach to biodiversity (Weitzman 1993, Solow
et al. 1993) in the following way. Assume that a pest has already optimally evolved its
genotype to attack species si in G. If it is easier for the si-speciﬁcp e s tt oe v o l v ei n t oa nsi+1
speciﬁcp e s tw h e nsi+1 is the closest to si in terms of a phenotypic measure, then there is a
link between the phenotypic-distance-based biodiversity valuation and welfare losses which
could be established, since in this case Red Queen dynamics might work towards eliminating
the less diverse system. Of course this is largely an empirical issue, but if such a relationship
exists it could provide a more precise link between the diversity function and welfare changes.
The above discussion suggests that our model could be generalized towards models at-
tempting to unify the economic optimization problem with more general models of hosts-pests
co-evolution, or multi-species models incorporating trap-crop type mechanisms. As in our
simple two-species model, biodiversity could increase welfare relative to a less diverse group,
through an insurance mechanism that prevents the evolution of pests that might wipe out
the whole group. Undoubtedly this is much more diﬃcult to model, but it seems an inter-
esting area for future research. At a more abstract level the general point of our paper is
this. Proper valuation of the biodiversity of a set S of species requires identiﬁcation of a
“suﬃcient” state vector, call it xS,w h i c hr e ﬂects the full interaction of S with the ecosystem
in which S is embedded to yield a workable approximation of the “true” state vector, call
it xS{true}. The quality of this approximation can be measured in terms of the deviation
of any approximation valuation from the “true” Bellman state valuation function”, call it
Vtrue(xS{true}). In this way we point towards identiﬁcation and proper measurement of
24some of the necessary ingredients that would go into a practical implementation of the gen-
eral approach to computation of “full value” advanced by, for example, Dasgupta and Maler
(2000).
25Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
By adding together the two biomass transition equations, the constraints regarding the
biomass and resource become:
˙ B = B (gR+ x(d2 − d1) − d2) − H (28)
˙ R = S − aR − gwRB (29)
˙ p = p[G(p,x) − 1] (30)
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ H ≤ Kmax (31)
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as:
HU = H + λ[B (gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2) − H]+µ(S − aR − gwRB)
+qp(G(x,p) − 1) + ξ (1 − x)+ζx (32)
where ξ and ζ are Lagrangian multipliers associated with the 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 constraint. Maxi-
mization of the current value Hamiltonian over H subject to (31) implies that the following





0 if λ > 1
Kmax if λ < 1
(33)
Furthermore the singular solution implies at the OSS that
λ =1 , ˙ B =0, ˙ R =0, ˙ p =0 (34)
H = B (gR+ x(d2 − d1) − d2) ,S− aR = gwRB , G(p,x)=1 (35)
We further analyze the singular solution, which represents the most interesting case, with
the help of the following lemma.




> 0 exists for the POMP and let ˆ B suﬃ-
c i e n t l yh i g hs u c ht h a t ˆ B>B. If Kmax > S
w + ˆ B (d2 − d1),t h e nλ =1 .




> 0 be an OSS. Then gwRB = S − aR. If at this OSS λ < 1,
then Kmax = B
¡









gR + x(d2 − d1)
¢
=
S − aR + wBx(d2 − d1) <S+ wBx(d2 − d1) , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
Therefore Kmax < S
w + Bx(d2 − d1) for λ < 1. Thus if Kmax > S
w + ˆ B (d2 − d1) then λ =1 .
Assuming Kmax > S
w + ˆ B (d2 − d1) we obtain at a steady state with positive biomass
λ =1,H= B (gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2) (36)




− ξ + ζ ≤ 0 ,x≥ 0 (37)
If 0 < x<1 then ξ = ζ =0
Furthermore the system for the costate variables at the steady state becomes
0=( gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2 − ρ) − µgwR (38)







q − xB (d2 − d1) (40)
From (38) and by combining (39) and (40) we obtain the following equations which determine
the OSS resource level
QS (R,ρ)=







To further characterize the OSS we note that if x =1at the OSS then p → 0 as shown by
(16) and the solution tends to a homogeneous system of variety 2. The same holds for x =0 .

















q = xB (d2 − d1) (45)





which determine the ﬁve unknowns (B,x,R,p,q) at the OSS.
A Most Rapid Approach Path for the Uniﬁed Model
The dimensionality of the uniﬁed model with respect to the state variables can be reduced
by transforming the problem into a MRAP problem. Substituting H by
H = B (gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2) − ˙ B (48)
into the objective function for the uniﬁed model, integrating by parts and assuming that





e−ρtB (gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2 − ρ)dt (49)
s.t. ˙ R = S − aR − gwRB
˙ p = p[G(p,x) − 1]
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ B ≤ Bmax
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is
G = B (gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2 − ρ)+µ(S − aR − gwRB)
+qp(G(p,x) − 1) (50)
35See Kamien and Schwartz (1991, p. 97).
28For positive biomass at an OSS the singular solution implies
gR+ xp(d2 − d1) − d2 − ρ = µgwR (51)





The maximum principle also implies that for the costate variables at the OSS







q − xB (d2 − d1) (54)
By comparing (51)-(54) with (37) and (38)-(40), it is clear that the OSS of the MRAP is the
same as the OSS of the complete uniﬁed model.
Then from (51) and (52) we obtain for the OSS controls
x∗ =
µgwR − gR+ d2 + ρ
p(d2 − d1)






= β (R,µ,p,q) (56)
Therefore, the MHDS for the MRAP problem at an OSS is deﬁned as:
0=S − aR − gwRB∗ (57)
0=G(p,x∗) − 1 (58)




























B1 = xB,B2 =( 1− x)B (63)
29H1 = xB
¡
gR + xp(d2 − d1) − d2
¢
(64)
H2 =( 1 − x)B
¡




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
By making the transformations (4)-(5) and adding the biomass transition equations we
obtain the current value Hamiltonian for this problem as:
HP = H + λ[B (gR+ x(d2 − d1) − d2) − H]+µ[S − aR − gwRB] (66)
Assuming as before Kmax > S
w + ˆ B (d2 − d1) we obtain
λ =1 , ˙ B =0, ˙ R =0 (67)
H = B (gR+ x(d2 − d1) − d2) ,S− aR = gwRB (68)





0,d 1 <d 2, and x should maximize λxB (d2 − d1) in (66), then the optimal choice should be
x =1 (69)
With λ =1 ,x=1the maximum principle implies that for the MHDS at the steady state:
0=( gR− d1 − ρ) − µgwR (70)
0=( ρ + a + gwB)µ − Bg (71)
S − aR = gwRB (72)
H = B (gR− d1) (73)
From the above system we obtain
Q1 (R,ρ,d 1)=







30Equations (74) and (75) determine the steady state R(d1) from the solution of Q1 (R,ρ,d 1)=
f (R,ρ). This steady state is not however sustainable since the genetic constraint (16) implies
that G(p,1) = 0 and p → 0 at the most rapid rate as shown in section III. Then the death
rate of plant variety 1, which is not exogenous as perceived by the private agents, tends to d2
or d1 (0) = d2. This means that eventually equilibrium is reached at the resource level R(d2)
which is deﬁned by:
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s,d2 R  p qx  B Bd2 in biomass H Hd2 in harvesting V2  V1 Index, H Index, D
0.5,0.5 13.65 5.94 0.3093 14.49 0.2164 18.593 16.779 10.81 3.953 3.431 15.22 52.218 0.522 0.339
0.4,0.5 13.73 5.87 0.3035 14.43 0.1841 18.282 16.779 8.96 3.869 3.431 12.77 43.821 0.478 0.300
0.3,0.5 13.81 5.79 0.2962 14.34 0.1480 17.949 16.779 6.97 3.773 3.431 9.98 34.231 0.419 0.252
0.2,0.5 13.89 5.71 0.2857 14.13 0.1071 17.588 16.779 4.82 3.663 3.431 6.76 23.199 0.340 0.191
0.1,0.5 13.99 5.62 0.2635 13.52 0.0604 17.195 16.779 2.48 3.554 3.431 3.57 12.250 0.228 0.113
0.01,0.5 13.35 6.23 0.9358 1684.88 0.1196 19.911 16.779 18.67 4.338 3.431 26.43 90.685 0.366 0.211
0.015,0.5 14.07 5.54 0.5889 14.10 0.0065 16.878 16.779 0.59 3.464 3.431 0.95 3.269 0.039 0.013
0.5,0.4 12.21 7.34 0.3093 15.46 0.2164 25.501 23.459 8.70 6.136 5.403 13.57 73.308 0.522 0.339
0.5,0.3 10.70 8.93 0.3093 15.37 0.2164 35.494 33.375 6.35 9.410 8.182 15.01 122.844 0.522 0.339
0.5,0.2 8.71 10.82 0.3094 13.46 0.2164 51.836 49.569 4.57 13.650 12.223 11.67 142.691 0.522 0.339
0.5,0.1 6.32 13.25 0.3993 7.49 0.2164 86.476 84.507 2.33 22.041 18.698 17.88 334.289 0.522 0.339